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In this paper we ask what can account for the continuing strong preference for academic 
education in Africa where the level of development is so low and there are few wage jobs and 
which form of educational investment, the academic or vocational, is most profitable. We argue 
that the answers to these questions are linked through the shape of the earnings function and the 
importance of firm effects. High levels of academic education have far higher returns than those 
available either from vocational or lower levels of academic. However at lower levels the 
vocational return can exceed the academic.  
 
 





This study uses data from the fourth and fifth rounds of survey work on Tanzania’s manufacturing sector. 
Round five was conducted between January-February 2002 and round four between November 1999 and 
January 2000. These rounds were undertaken by combined teams from the Centre for Study of African 
Economies (CSAE) in Oxford and the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) in Dar es 
Salaam. The original three surveys in the early 1990s, upon which this later work builds, were undertaken 
as part of the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) organised by the Africa Technical 
Department of the World Bank. This dataset forms part of an ongoing CSAE research project into 
manufacturing sector performance in Tanzania and Ghana funded by the ESRC under the Global Poverty 
Research Group and the Department for International Development (DFID). We are greatly indebted to 
Måns Söderbom for preventing errors and making many valuable suggestions. John Knight and Adrian 
Wood raised many insightful queries with respect to an earlier version of this paper which led us to revise 
several of our interpretations of the results. Three referees made very constructive suggestions that led to 
major improvements in the paper. Remaining errors are ours. The data used in this paper and a STATA do 







The conflict between the wish of educators in Africa to supply vocational education while 
students and their parents demand an academic one has been a continuing theme in discussions of 
educational policy in Africa since the now classic works of Foster (1965a,b). Tanzania is a 
country which has been through a cycle of policy making which began in the 1960s with an 
attempt to shift the educational system towards a more vocational focus and a restriction on the 
supply of secondary education (see Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1985) and Knight and Sabot 
(1990)) and ended in the 1990s with a reversal of many of its key educational policies. While 
Tanzania’s shifts have been more dramatic than most a general trend away from vocational 
schooling to more general academic education was apparent in the 1990s. This process had 
powerful backing from those investing in education. The Education Sector Review of the World 
Bank (1995) argued that there was a general case that the rate of return was much higher to 
investments in academic than in vocational secondary education.  
This ‘new’ view - that it is academic not vocational training that should underlie 
educational policy - has not gone unchallenged. Bennell (1996 a, b) reports some higher rates of 
returns to vocational education than the rates of return to general education and argues strongly 
against any underlying presumption that academic education has a higher return than vocational. 
A similar argument can be found in Bennell and Sergerstrom (1998). Two papers which report 
higher returns from vocational than academic education are a study by Neuman and Ziderman 
(1989, 1991) for Israel and one by Moenjak and Worswick (2003) for Thailand.  
Indeed research findings do appear to be inconclusive. Zymelman (1976) in a review of 
school-based vocational training concluded that there was no clear evidence either for or against 
this type of educational provision. Chung (1995) in a review of the literature undertaken from the 
1970s to the early 1990s found that twelve studies on returns to vocational education in 
developing countries reported higher returns to vocational training, ten studies reported lower 
returns to vocational education or not different from other forms of learning, and five studies 
concluded that there is no basis to compare the returns to vocational education with the returns 
from other forms of learning. Other studies have stressed that the returns to vocational education 
depend substantially on the general level of economic development, the availability of private 
sector jobs, and whether or not people are employed in a field related to their training (Bennell 
and Segerstrom (1998) and Middleton et al. (1993)). 
In parallel with the concern to promote skills within schools by means of vocational 
schooling has been the perceived need to promote training within firms to address problems of 
poor productivity. A large literature has developed arguing that limited skills is the key to 





Pack (2002). The central premise of much of this discussion has been that markets for skills will 
not operate and that there is a need to subsidise firms to ensure that the training occurs. 
In this paper we ask three questions flowing from these concerns. First, what can account 
for the continuing strong preference for academic education in Africa where the level of 
development is so low and wage jobs are expanding so slowly (see Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal 
(2006) for a review of the empirical evidence for this assertion)? Secondly, what can account for 
the diversity of the findings in the literature regarding the returns from vocational and academic 
education and is any general answer possible as to which has the higher returns? Thirdly, and 
most specifically, which forms of educational investment have been most profitable in terms of 
increasing incomes - vocational school, technical college, academic education or on-the-job 
training - in Tanzania? We will argue that the answers to all these questions are linked through 
the shape of the earnings function and the role of firm effects in determining earnings.  
In the next section we set out the background as to how enrolment has changed in 
Tanzanian schools over the period from the 1960s to 2000. In section 3 we set out the earnings 
function we will use. An extensive literature has been concerned with two econometric problems 
that arise in estimating such functions in developing countries. The first is the possibility of a 
selectivity bias as wage earners are not a random sample of the population, Moenjak and 
Worswick (2003) find a much higher return on vocational education for Thailand when they 
allow for selectivity. Tansel (1994), who also allows for selection, finds high returns to 
vocational education in Turkey for the young. The second problem is that the return on education 
may be biased up if ability is omitted from the equation. Both these issues are extensively 
discussed in Söderbom et al (2006) for the data that will be used in this paper. They can find no 
evidence from instrumenting that the returns from education go down, which is in line with 
virtually all research in this area (see Card (2001) for a review). In this paper we follow their 
control function approach of using the residuals from an auxiliary for education to test if the 
results are biased due to the endogeneity of education. In section 4 we set out how we propose to 
use the data to address the issue of how returns from vocational and academic schools can be 
compared. Sections 5 reports results for the sample as a whole, section 6 sets out the returns by 
the size class of firms. In section 7 we consider the returns to on-the-job training. Finally we 
return to the most general issue under review - the returns to vocational relative to academic 
education.  
  
2  Education and training in Tanzania 
 
Since independence the education and training system of Tanzania has gone through distinct 
regimes, primarily influenced by changing political objectives and economic constraints. In 1961, 





Maliyamkono and Kahama (1986), 95 secondary schools with a total capacity of 11,832 pupils, 
and a few crafts and technical schools with the total capacity of 1,500 pupils, Ministry of 
Education (1968). At the university level there was the University of East Africa that admitted 
students from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The annual intake of Tanzanian students to the 
University of East Africa was about 200, United Republic of Tanzania (1964).  
Tanzania adopted ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ in 1967 and after 1968 “formal 
education comprised seven years of primary, four years of ‘ordinary’ secondary and two years of 
‘advanced’ secondary education”, Buchert (1994). This change replaced the system which had 
operated since the Second World War of 4 years of primary and 4 years of middle school which 
were then the prelude to secondary schooling. Other changes made at this time included the 
introduction of Swahili as the sole teaching language in primary schools and the setting of a 
target to achieve Universal Primary Education (U.P.E.) by November 1977. The objective was a 
transformation into a mass educational system, whereby formal study could end for most after 
seven years, Ministry of Education (1968).  
Reforms which began in the mid 1980s represented, in many respects, a reversal of the 
policies introduced in 1967. The free education system was replaced by a cost-sharing scheme, 
and private sector participation in educational provision was enhanced. These reforms of the 
education system were introduced after severe budget problems and a general economic crisis in 
the 1970s and 1980s and were part of the social, political and economic reforms introduced in the 
mid 1980s, Galabawa (2000).  
The changes in enrolment rates for the various education levels over the period 1962-
2000, shown in Table 1, reflect these changing political priorities. From 1967 to 1981 primary 
enrolment rose from 37 to 93 per cent of the 7-14 age cohort. This enrolment rate then declined 
until the early 1990s after which a modest recovery was effected to 84 per cent by 2000. In 
contrast enrolment rates for secondary and post-secondary level expanded modestly until 1981 
and then accelerated rapidly to 2000 such that between 1981 and 2001 enrolment rates at the 
secondary level more than doubled from 5 to 13 per cent of the relevant age cohorts (see Table 
1). The work of Knight and Sabot (1990) used this limited expansion of secondary education 
until 1980 as the basis for a comparison between Tanzania and Kenya as to the differential effects 
of investment in education in the two countries. Söderbom (et al) (2006) provide a comparison of 
how the returns to education in Kenya and Tanzania have changed over the period since 1990 
using the same data for Tanzania as will be used in this paper.  
In the area of training there have also been major changes in policy over the period. Until 
the end of the 1980s Tanzania had a centralised labour market with a government set pay 
structure and centrally planned labour supply (including job training) and utilization. Most firms 
were state owned and some large firms had their own training centres. In the 1990s policies of 





included privatisation of state owned firm, abolition of centralized labour allocation and gradual 
elimination of government set wages and the introduction of wage bargaining at an enterprise  
TABLE 1 
TOTAL ENROLMENT AND PERCENTAGE OF ENROLMENT TO RELEVANT POPULATION 
COHORTS FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF LEARNING INSTITUTIONS IN TANZANIA 1960-2000 


















1962  518,663  33.10  13,690  2.25 485 0.10  203  0.03  299 
1963  592,104  33.52  16,604  2.33 572 0.12  305  0.04  327 
1964  633,678  35.28  18,830  2.51 1,067 0.21 407  0.05 360 
1965  710,200  36.19  20,529  2.69 1,386 0.27 642  0.08 335 
1966  740,991  36.33  22,240  2.76 1,596 0.29 740  0.08 350 
1967 753,114  37.42  23,842  2.92  1,709 0.31  1,313  0.15 318 
1968 765,169  37.95  26,829  3.14  1,214 0.21  1,498  0.17 320 
1969 776,109  37.99  27,322  3.19  2,636 0.44  1,975  0.21 305 
1970 827,974  38.02  28,322  3.23  2,895 0.47  2,086  0.22 343 
1971 902,609  38.67  29,559  3.25  3,044 0.49  2,099  0.21 368 
1972 1,003,396  39.72  30,185  3.27  3,228 0.50  2,230  0.22 380 
1973 1,106,387  40.23  31,021  3.26  3,481 0.53  2,345  0.22 375 
1974 1,288,886  42.26  32,246  3.25  3,680 0.54  2,337  0.20 351 
1975 1,532,953  50.22  34,560  3.20  3,767 0.53  2,402  0.20 395 
1976 1,954,442  59.32  36,218  3.28  3,729 0.51  2,828  0.23 400 
1977 2,020,883  59.83  37,878  3.62  4,082 0.54  3,075  0.24 418 
1978 2,751,931  78.66  39,527  3.84  3,842   0.50  3,038  0.23  420 
1979 3,076,210  85.52  46,353  3.92  3,884 0.50  3,002  0.22 413 
1980 3,359,966  90.56  63,607  4.25  3,685 0.49  3,051  0.22 469 
1981 3,538,183  92.79  63,826  4.68  3,776 0.47  3,006  0.21 478 
1982 3,512,799  89.93  64,834  4.92  4,310 0.47  3,018  0.21 510 
1983 3,561,410  88.05  66,564  4.96  4,655 0.51  3,049  0.20 525 
1984 3,483,944  84.76  69,083  5.10  5,127 0.55  3,069  0.19 484 
1985 3,169,759  75.10  77,400  5.37  5,697 0.59  3,025  0.18 506 
1986 3,158,839  72.73  85,706  5.53  5,936 0.61  3,085  0.18 604 
1987 3,159,726  70.85  97,854  6.23  6,192 0.63  3,042  0.17 634 
1988 3,165,113  69.27  112,619  7.19  6,221 0.62  3,065  0.16 610 
1989 3,258,601  70.23  125,397  7.87  7,012 0.68  3,087  0.15 680 
1990 3,373,000  71.47  136,729  8.35 8,513 0.81  3100  0.15 850 
1991  3,507,000  77.3 156,250 9.32  10,562 0.97 3221  0.14 1,824 
1992  3,600,000  71.1 164,117 9.51  11,786 1.05 3543  0.16 1,698 
1993  3,733,000  77.3 168,302 9.52  12,597 1.10 4594  0.19 1,760 
1994  3,793,000  76.8 173,620 9.52  12,672 1.07 5407  0.21 1,669 
1995  3,878,000  76.5 183,659 9.81  12,716 1.05 7897  0.31 1,896 
1996  3,943,000  75.5 185,449 9.71  13,974 1.12 9370  0.35 1,827 
1997 4,052,000  77.9  205,562  10.32  18045 1.40  10,781  0.39  1,859 
1998  4,032,000  79.2 208,738  10.29 18,165 1.37  12,069  0.43 1,833 
1999  4,183,000  82.0 225,866  10.77 21,713 1.59  12,555  0.43 2,049 
2000  4,136,000  83.7 238,254  10.97 23,702 1.69  13,442  0.45 2,178 
Source: Tanzania Statistical Abstract (1995), Tanzania Economic Surveys (1964, 1968, 1977, 1982, 2001), Tanganyika 
Five-Year Plan (1964) and Official Statistical from National Bureau of Statistics. The gross enrolment figures from 
1991-2000 for primary school are from official source in the Ministry of Education. The gross enrolment figures for 
other years are author’s computation. The information of total population, and population categorised by age groups 
reported in the census reports summarised in statistical abstracts along with total enrolments information for each 
education level are used to compute the gross enrolment rates. Figures for technical education from 1990 are from 
Basic Statistics on higher education prepared by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education.  
 
level. Due to privatisation, restructuring and closure of some state owned firms, training centres 
that used to operate under specific companies closed down, VETA (1997). The new Training Act 
(of 1994) established an autonomous training authority. Employers are now integrated within the 
training system as they have a say on the matters related to the type of training provided and also 
contribute to the cost of training through a 2% levy paid annually. While these reforms to the 





clearly show the continuing belief among policy makers that central direction, and subsidisation, 
of training remains necessary. 
 
3  The specification of the earnings function 
 
Our empirical strategy is to estimate an earnings function of the standard form (Becker (1964), 
Mincer (1974)) in which we have controls for experience, imputed from age less years at school 
less six, and tenure and then introduce education and training allowing for the fact that when the 
student enters vocational school or technical college may be important for the return to that level 
of education. As will be discussed in more detail below our data was collected in a way that 
enables us to identify the path taken by the student through the education system. In particular we 
know the highest level they completed before entering vocational school or technical college. We 
also know whether they went on to obtain professional qualifications or received higher 
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where i, j and t are subscripts of individual, firm and time respectively.  
 
Ln E is log of real earnings, Exp the potential experience of the worker, measured as age-years of 
education-6, Tenure the length of time spent in their current firm, CJT is a dummy if the worker 
is receiving current on-the-job training, PJT a dummy for whether a worker received on-the-job 
training in the past and STC is a dummy for whether they went on a short training course in the 
last six months. T are time dummies, µ are firm fixed effects and ε is the error term. 
  We identify the highest level of education achieved where the dummy variables are for 
those who completed the following levels of education: Primary School, Middle School, O and 
A-Level Secondary, Professional and Higher Education, which is those with a degree. The 
omitted category is those with no education. We then identify two categories of non-academic 
education that undertaken at vocational schools and that undertaken at technical colleges. In the 
case of vocational schools we identify if the student enters vocational school after primary 
(primary_vocational), after middle school (middle_vocational), after O-level 
(OLevel_vocational) or after A-Level (ALevel_vocational). Similarly for those using technical 
college we identify if they enter after O-Level (OLevel-techCol) or after A-level 





mid 1970s we will focus on the return to other levels as these are of current concern for policy 
purposes.  
  This way of classifying students means that the return on vocational school or technical 
college can differ depending on at which stage the student enters the school or college. The 
returns to vocational schooling may well differ depending on the stage of the educational cycle at 
which it occurs. Söderbom (et al) (2006) document, using this data, that the returns from 
education are strongly non-linear and convex. In their paper they model education by means of a 
spline function which allows the returns to education to differ across levels. We wish to measure 
the increment in earnings which accrue to attending vocational school so this dummy variable 
approach is the most general specification we can adopt. So can identify the returns to vocational 
education after primary (RORpv), after O-Level (RORov) and after A-Level (RORav). A similar 
argument applies to progress through technical college so we have the returns to technical 
education after O-Level (RORot) and after A-Level (RORat). The rates of return which we will be 
reporting are defined as follows
1: 
exp(( )/2) 1 pv v pv p ROR θ θθ =+ − −   exp(( )/3) 1 ot t ot t ROR θ θθ = +− −  
exp(( )/2) 1 ov v ov o ROR θ θθ =+ − −  exp(( )/3) 1 at t at a ROR θ θθ = +− −  
exp(( )/2) 1 av v av a ROR θ θθ =+ − −    
These rates of return need then to be compared with those available to those who follow an 
exclusively academic stream which we define as follows: 
exp( /7) 1 pp ROR θ =−   exp(( )/2) 1 aa o ROR θ θ = −−  
exp( /8) 1 mm ROR θ =−   0 exp(( )/2) 1 pr pr ROR θ θ = −−  
exp(( )/4) 1 oo p ROR θ θ =− −   exp(( )/3) 1 he he a ROR θ θ = −−  
These are the Mincerian rates of return from following alternative paths through the 
education system where it is assumed growth between the highest completed levels of education 
and the level before is exponential. We need to make an assumption as to how long it takes to 
complete any level of education and we present those assumptions in Table 2 where we have 
reported the median years of education which will be used in this Mincerian calculation.  
One of our contributions in this paper is to show that rates of return differ depending on 
how students proceed through the education system. A second contribution follows from our 
ability to match firm characteristics with the education of the workers. There is work, using the 
labour force data from these firms, showing that part of the return to education results from a 
process of sorting so that workers in larger firms receive a higher return on education than those 
in smaller firms, Fafchamps, Söderbom and Benhassine (2006). There is also work showing that 
firm size is an important correlate of wages paid in these firms, Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006). 





our measure of firm size. If the effect of size is to increase the return, for example, on A-Level 
more than it increase the return on vocational after A-Level then it is perfectly possible (as we 
will see) for the returns to vocational education to be negative. The implications of any such 
negative returns will be taken up after the results are presented. 
We turn now to consider measuring the returns to training in the firm. We have three 
measures of training; the first (CJT) is whether the worker is currently receiving on-the-job 
training; the second (PJT) is whether such training occurred in the past and the third whether the 
worker has attended a short training course, (STC). These are simply dummy variables and thus a 
very crude measure of training. In their defence it can be argued that training within the firm is 
actually very difficult to measure and a simple measure of any or none (which is the form our 
variables takes) at least avoids the problems posed by comparing the range of activities which is 
the typical pattern of within firm training. The more basic problem with the variable is that it is 
endogenous in that individuals may be selected for training on the grounds, unobservable to the 
econometrician, that they are more able. Thus any return to training may capture not the effect of 
the training but the effects of the selection. While we have not sought to model the selection 
process we do have firm-level panel data so we can allow for a range of factors which may be 
correlated with the training and thus cause potential bias in the estimated returns on training. As 
we will show these are important factors in understanding what determines the return on training. 
 
4  Data and variables  
 
The data used in this study is from the fourth and fifth rounds of the Tanzanian Manufacturing 
Enterprise surveys. The fifth round was conducted between January-February 2002 and covered a 
total of 192 manufacturing enterprises in 6 main industrial locations in Tanzania. The fourth 
round was conducted between November 1999 and January 2000. These surveys were the follow-
up to the three Regional Program of Enterprise Development (RPED) surveys carried out in the 
early 1990s. We confine ourselves to the fourth and fifth rounds as the education questions were 
then asked in a way that allows us to make the distinction we require as to when a workers left 
the main academic stream and entered a vocational school or technical college. As in both the 
fourth and fifth waves of the survey recall questions were asked we have four years of data 
spanning the period 1997 to 2000. Table 2 shows summary statistics for education and earnings 
across these four years.   
We have a sample of 2527. Column (1) of Table 2 shows how this sample is distributed 
across the educational categories we can identify. The two categories on which we wish to focus 
are those who went to technical college, which was 5 per cent of the sample, and those who 
attended vocational school, which is 20 per cent of the sample. Clearly vocational school is far 
more important than technical college and attending vocational school was reasonably common. 





earn far more than those who attended vocational school, US$ 75 as compared with US$ 44 per 
month. Also it is apparent from the Table that the earnings of those with O-Level qualification 
are very similar to those with vocational training. It will matter when students entered vocational 
school or technical college. In Column (3) we show when students entered vocational school. 
While most enter after primary school, 66 per cent, a substantial number, 27 per cent enter after 
O-Level and a relatively small number, 3 per cent, after A-Level. By far the most common path 
into technical school is after O-Level, 79 per cent of the sample. This data confirms what we 
know from how academic and vocational education is structured. Entry levels differ and there is a 































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Higher Education  2.5  272      16 
Professional 5.5  83    13 
Technical College  5.4  75      14 
Vocational 19.7  44    9 
A-Level 1.7  87  2.6  11.0  13 
O-Level  10.3 47 27.4  79.4 11 
Middle 2.5  50  4.0  9.6  8 
Primary 48.3  33  65.6  0  7 
None 4.2  27  0.4  0  0 
Average    39     
N    2527      
 
  At the same time as the workers were interviewed information was also collected about 
the firms in which they were employed. This data referred to the year before the earnings data. 
We have matched the firm level data with the earnings data such that, for example, firm data for 
1992 is matched to the earning for 1993. A similar procedure is used throughout the period. The 
earnings variable was obtained by taking the total monthly earnings, plus any allowances 
received which include food, clothing and housing. In addition any annual and/or Christmas 








5  Rates of Return on Vocational and Academic Education in the Sample 
 
In this section we present our empirical results assessing the effects of vocational and general 
education and job training on earnings. Table 3 shows the first four regressions that will the basis 
for our initial analysis. All the regressions control for gender, tenure and potential experience and 
whether or not the worker is employed in the capital city. The means and the full definitions of 
the variables are given in Appendix 1. In Column (1) we report our basic regression where the 
returns to vocational education and technical college are allowed to vary depending on the entry 
level of the student and in Column (2) we allow for the potential endogeneity of education by 
means of an auxiliary regression reported in Appendix 3.
2 In Column (3) we allow for the process 
of sorting, documented by Fafchamps, Söderbom and Benhassine (2006), by which workers in 
certain kind of firms may receive a higher return on education than those in other types of firm. 
We do this here by allowing for firm fixed effects. Finally in Column (4) of the Table we control 
for the endogeneity of education in addition to the controls for firm fixed effects.   
Before presenting the results it is useful to set out how these differing sets of controls 
will affect the results. We will discuss the returns to vocational education but exactly the same 
issues apply in assessing the returns to going to technical college. The ROR will depend on two 
aspects of the educational path followed by the worker. The first is when entry to vocational 
school occurred and the second is the type of firms in which the worker is employed. In the case 
of entry into vocational school after primary the ROR is given by: exp(( )/2) 1 vp vp θ θθ + −− . So 
the ROR will be a function of the size of  pv θ and how all the elements of the ROR are affected by 
firm fixed effects.  
The implications for these alternative approaches for the calculation of the ROR are most 
readily seen by presenting the point estimates as we do in Figure 1.
3 The top left part of Figure 1 
reports the implied estimates for the Mincerian rates of return from Table 3 Column (1). It is 
these rates of return that are usually cited in comparisons between vocational and academic 
education. Two points stand out from this Figure. The first is that in assessing the returns to 
vocational and technical college the level of entry does matter. For those who enter vocational 
school after primary, which is 66 per cent of our sample, the Mincerian return is higher than for 
those that enter after O-Level, 9.6 as compared with 8.8 per sent. For those who enter after A-
Level the returns are much lower, 3.2 per cent. A similar pattern holds for those going to 
technical college, for those who enter after O-Level the returns are 10.5 per cant compared with 






Table 3: Dependent Variable: Ln (Earnings in 1994 US$) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS  Education 
Endogenous  FE  FE, Endogenous 
Education 
Male  0.117 0.108 0.121 0.097 
 (2.30)*  (1.93)  (4.24)**  (3.28)** 
Capcity 0.132  0.132     
 (2.38)*  (2.37)*     
Exp  0.047 0.047 0.038 0.038 
 (7.14)**  (7.13)**  (10.29)**  (10.26)** 
Expsq  -0.073 -0.074 -0.054 -0.056 
  (6.20)** (6.26)** (8.01)** (8.23)** 
Tenure  0.000 0.000 0.007 0.006 
 (0.03)  (0.00)  (3.54)**  (3.40)** 
Primary 0.196  0.159  0.042  -0.045 
 (3.18)**  (2.05)*  (0.80)  (0.76) 
Middle  0.481 0.422 0.237 0.094 
 (4.29)**  (3.00)**  (3.05)**  (1.05) 
O-level  0.588 0.515 0.322 0.152 
 (7.94)**  (4.10)**  (5.36)**  (1.90) 
A-level  1.263 1.174 0.721 0.514 
  (7.23)** (5.20)** (7.81)** (4.55)** 
Vocation  0.855 0.768 0.808 0.596 
 (7.28)**  (4.47)**  (2.43)*  (1.76) 
Techcol  0.947 0.858 0.714 0.495 
  (4.12)** (3.43)** (5.17)** (3.21)** 
Profes  1.094 0.995 0.694 0.462 
 (6.89)**  (5.30)**  (10.17)**  (4.62)** 
Highered  2.156 2.032 1.382 1.092 
  (13.53)** (9.12)** (16.38)** (8.77)** 
Train_current  0.218 0.217 0.003 0.001 
 (2.97)**  (2.96)**  (0.08)  (0.04) 
Train_past 0.059  0.059  -0.011  -0.010 
  (1.38) (1.38) (0.43) (0.41) 
Train_sc  0.170 0.169 0.112 0.110 
 (2.47)*  (2.45)*  (3.09)**  (3.03)** 
Voc_primary  -0.476 -0.446 -0.626 -0.548 
 (4.24)**  (3.85)**  (1.90)  (1.66) 
Voc_middle  -0.247 -0.238 -0.323 -0.292 
  (1.31) (1.30) (0.93) (0.84) 
Voc_olevel  -0.098 -0.100 -0.281 -0.277 
  (0.76) (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) 
Voc_alevel 0.471  0.441  -0.020  -0.077 
  (1.59) (1.50) (0.06) (0.22) 
Techcol_olevel  -0.061 -0.076 -0.108 -0.134 
  (0.24) (0.30) (0.78) (0.97) 
Techcol_alevel 0.529 0.493 0.144 0.070 





Table 3 Continued 
Res_educ   0.010  0.024 
   (0.70)   (3.16)** 
Constant  2.651 2.722 2.827 2.990 
  (26.21)** (19.11)** (41.37)** (34.96)** 
Observations  2527 2527 2527 2527 
R-squared  0.41 0.41 0.29 0.29 
Number of firms      235  235 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
   
 
 
Figure 1: Mincerian Returns, the Endogeneity of Education and Firm Fixed Effects 
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from the academic to the vocational stream the lower are the returns. The second point that is 
clear from the top left part of Figure 1 is that the ROR for the upper levels of the academic stream 
are massively higher than for those following a vocational one A-Level (40.2 per cent) and 
university (34.6 per cent).
4   
This last pattern is the one which arises from the convexity of the earnings function, a 
result which has been found elsewhere in poor countries, Kingdon and Unni (2001) and 
Duraisamy (2002) for India and Aslam (2007) for Pakistan. One possible source of such 
convexity is the potential bias which arises from the endogeneity of education in the 
specification, a subject which has been the focus of a very large volume of research, Card (2001). 





for endogeneity by means of a control function approach, the basis for which is set out in 
Appendix 3. The result is to reduce the returns to education, but by very modest amounts, and not 
to alter at all the patterns shown in the top left of Figure 1. This finding that allowing for the 
endogeneity of education has little, if any impact, in reducing the returns to education is one 
common in the literature, Card (2001). 
In contrast to the limited impact that allowing for endogeneity has on the returns is the 
much larger impact of allowing for firm fixed effects which we show in the top right of Figure 1. 
There are substantial falls in the return to education at nearly all levels. These falls are 
particularly large for those in the academic stream, indeed the return on A-level is roughly halved 
while the return to university education is reduced from 35 to 25 per cent. Finally in the bottom 
right of Figure 1 we report the results of allowing for both firm fixed effect and endogeneity. It is 
clear from the right hand side of Figure 1 that allowing for both firm fixed effects and the 
potential endogeneity of education results in a remarkable similarity in the return to education 
from post primary to below A-Level of 5-7 per cent, a rate of return less than half that available 
from higher levels of the academic stream.  
 
6  Rates of Returns on Vocational and Academic Education by Firm Size 
 
How should these results be interpreted? In particular should we control for fixed effect when 
assessing the returns to education? It is possible to argue that such controls are inappropriate. As 
Fafchamps, Söderbom and Benhassine (2006) argue education may well be more productive in 
certain types of firms and thus part of the return to education accrues in the form of a better 
“match” between the firm and the worker. However certain controls may be crucial for 
understanding how vocational and other technical training impacts on earnings and one is that the 
effect may differ by the size of the firm. There are two reasons why firm size may matter. The 
first is that large firms are over-represented in our sample. The second follows from our concern 
to identify the path through the educational system that the worker has taken. To see the 
implications of firm size we can write the ROR allowing for the effects of size as: 
exp(( )/2) 1
s
pv v v pv p p ROR ll ll θθ θ θθ =+ ⋅ + − − ⋅ −  where ll is the log of firm size. Size may 
increase both the returns to attending vocational school and the return from attending primary in 
a way that reduces the ROR on vocational school if the effect on primary is larger than the effect 
on having attended vocational school. 
In Table 4 Column (1) we report the results for extending the specification of Table 3 by 
allowing for the effects of size on the returns to education, Table 4 Column (2) allows for firm 
fixed effects in this more general specification, Table 4 Column (3) allows both firm fixed effects 





Table 4: Dependent Variable: Ln (Earnings in 1994 US$) 







Male  0.149 0.109 0.091 
  (3.10)** (3.86)** (3.11)** 
Capcity  0.124 0.000 0.000 
 (2.55)*  (.)  (.) 
Exp  0.035 0.037 0.037 
 (5.87)**  (10.21)**  (10.17)** 
Expsq  -0.053 -0.053 -0.054 
  (5.01)** (7.86)** (8.03)** 
Tenure -0.001  0.008  0.007 
 (0.33)  (3.97)**  (3.85)** 
Primary  0.185 0.134 0.062 
  (1.12) (1.21) (0.54) 
Middle  0.190 0.326 0.207 
  (0.69) (1.68) (1.04) 
O-level  0.439 0.370 0.233 
 (2.28)*  (3.20)**  (1.82) 
A-Level  0.760 0.509 0.360 
 (3.07)**  (3.60)**  (2.36)* 
Vocation  0.678 0.825 0.651 
 (4.30)**  (2.46)*  (1.90) 
Techcol  0.422 0.625 0.443 
 (0.98)  (2.40)*  (1.64) 
Profes -0.116  0.162  -0.016 
  (0.38) (0.94) (0.09) 
Highered  1.201 1.335 1.132 
  (2.71)** (4.63)** (3.79)** 
Train_current 0.007  -0.175  -0.174 
 (0.05)  (2.05)*  (2.04)* 
Train_past  -0.080 -0.074 -0.076 
  (0.95) (1.21) (1.23) 
Train_sc  0.121 0.035 0.017 
  (0.83) (0.33) (0.16) 
Voc_primary  -0.421 -0.548 -0.487 
  (1.90) (1.60) (1.42) 
Voc_middle  -0.445 -0.252 -0.231 
  (1.32) (0.66) (0.60) 
Voc_olevel  -0.233 -0.236 -0.234 
  (0.95) (0.69) (0.68) 
Voc_alevel 0.043  -0.206  -0.235 
  (0.15) (0.56) (0.63) 
Techcol_olevel 0.066  -0.160  -0.180 
  (0.17) (0.75) (0.85) 
Techcol_alevel 0.236  -0.229  -0.269 
  (0.57) (0.90) (1.06) 





Table  4  Continued     
  (0.04) (0.85) (0.83) 
Middle_ll 0.073  -0.028  -0.027 
  (0.88) (0.53) (0.52) 
O-Level_ll 0.022  -0.014  -0.014 
  (0.38) (0.45) (0.45) 
A-Level_ll  0.081 0.045 0.040 
  (1.51) (1.40) (1.26) 
Voc_ll 0.034  -0.002  -0.001 
  (1.20) (0.12) (0.07) 
Techcol_ll  0.063 0.046 0.047 
  (1.17) (1.29) (1.32) 
Profes_ll  0.222 0.119 0.118 
  (3.50)** (3.60)** (3.58)** 
Highered_ll 0.062  -0.021  -0.024 
  (0.89) (0.42) (0.48) 
Train_current_ll  0.033 0.045 0.044 
 (0.95)  (2.13)*  (2.11)* 
Train_past_ll  0.031 0.016 0.017 
  (1.38) (1.00) (1.04) 
Train_sc_ll  0.001 0.016 0.021 
  (0.04) (0.68) (0.85) 
ll  0.065 0.029 0.030 
  (1.18) (0.56) (0.57) 
Res_educ     0.020 
     (2.55)* 
Constant  2.605 2.736 2.866 
  (13.51)** (14.86)** (15.02)** 
Observations  2527 2527 2527 
R-squared  0.48 0.30 0.31 
Number of firms    235  235 
F Test that education 








Robust t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
from Table 4, now varies by firm size and we will report results for small firms (those with 10 
employees) and large firms (defined as those with 100 employees). The p value decisively rejects 
the hypothesis that these interaction terms are not significantly different from zero. We appear to 
have convincing evidence from Table 4 that we must allow not only for the entry point into any 
level of vocational education but the fact that the returns to this will differ depending on the size 
of the firm. 
We show in Figure 2 the Mincerian returns to the vocational and academic streams by 
firm size using the estimates available from Table 4. As we would anticipate from the results of 
Fafchamps, Söderbom and Benhassine (2006) the returns on education vary by firm size. 





rates of return at O-level and below is modest while the rates of return on both A-Levels and 
professional qualifications are much higher in large than small firms. Because the impact of firm 
size on the intermediate level qualification of A-Level is much larger than its impact on  
 
Figure 2 Mincerian Returns by Firm Size 
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Note: A large firm is defined as one with 100 employees, a small firm as one with 10 employees. 
 
university education the effect of firm size is to reduce the return on university education in large 
firms. Indeed once we allow for firm size the returns to dimensions of vocational and technical 
education are now negative, sometimes substantially as in entering vocational education after A-





Such results present us with a problem. Why if the returns are negative go at all? The 
effect cannot be causal. A possible source of the problem lies in the unobservables in the 
regressions which underlie Figure 2. We can use the results reported in Table 4 Column (2) to ask 
if allowing for firm fixed effects does allow us to identify a possibly positive effect of vocational 
and technical college on earnings at all educational entry levels. The results are reported in the 
second row of Figure 2 which presents a similar calculation to that in the top row but with 
controls for fixed effects.  
It is clear that that firm fixed effects are an important factor in explaining the net negative 
return from vocational training. It is now the case that for vocational school after O-Level the 
returns among both small and large firms are positive and as large, or larger, than the returns 
from O-Level. It remains true that the returns from vocational or technical college after A-Level 
remain negative in large firms although it is far lower than in the case where there are no controls 
for firm fixed effects. 
  The implication of these results is clear. Low wage firms tend to employ those with some 
form of vocational or technical education - there is a negative correlation between the 
unobservables determining wages and those with vocational or technical qualifications. While 
this result follows from the firm-fixed effect, it may well reflect, in part, the unobserved quality 
of the workers. If firms which employ those with technical qualifications end up with a low-
quality workforce then the firm fixed effect is simply picking up this quality dimension of the 
worker. If this interpretation is correct then in assessing the return from vocational or technical 
schooling it is necessary to control for the firm fixed effect. Conditional on the worker quality we 
see that for the large majority of those attending vocational or technical school the returns are 
positive and higher than O-level. For those who attend vocational school after primary, 67 per 
cent of our sample, the return is 10 per cent for those in small firms and 14 per cent for those in 
large firms. For those who attend technical college after O-level, 79 per cent of our sample, the 
Mincerian return is 8 per cent in small firms and 13 per cent in large ones.  
  Finally in Figure 2 we show, in the bottom row, the effect of controlling for the 
endogeneity of education in addition to the fixed effects. As in Figure 1 we find that this makes 
little difference to the results. It is the firm fixed effect which is of far greater importance in 
affecting the pattern of the returns to education.  
 
7  The Return to On-the-job Training 
 
We turn now to consider the returns to on-the-job training. The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 
allow for the possibility that the three forms of training we can identify - currently being trained 
in the firm, having been given training in the past in the firm and attending a short training course 





problematic as endogeneity is an even more acute problem than it is in the case for education. It 
seems very likely that the relatively able will be chosen for training so any increment from 
earnings from such training will confound the training with the ability. However if this form of 
endogeneity is of importance it is easy to sign so we can regard any estimate of the effect of past 
training on earnings as an upper estimate. In Figure 3 we present the implied returns from the 
three forms of training which are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
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Among small firms there is a substantial return to current training and attending a short training 





for all forms of training are higher in larger firms. As with our earlier discussion the effects of 
fixed effects are very important while allowing for endogeneity is much less so.   
Our results strongly suggest that the positive correlation between earnings and current 
and past training is due to the fact that firms which train pay more. It is only for those attending a 
short training course that there is any evidence that attending this course is associated with a rise 
in earnings. The results for past training are particularly striking in that, allowing for fixed effects 
there is no positive return in either small or large firms.  If it had been the case that earnings rose 
with training, within the firm, there would have been the issue as to whether this was due to some 
unobservable of the worker. However we cannot find such an effect.
5 
It is possible to advance an interpretation that the firm fixed effect has captured the 
quality of the workforce from the training. If that is so the training benefits all the workers in the 
firm not simply the person trained who sees no return from the training except through the firm 
effect. Given that firms do train some mechanism along these lines seems the most likely 
explanation for our inability to find an effect from training within the firm.  
 
8  The Returns from Academic and Vocational Education 
 
In the introduction we posed three questions. First, what can account for the continuing strong 
preference for academic education in Africa where the level of development is so low and wage 
jobs are expanding so slowly? Secondly, what can account for the diversity of the findings in the 
literature regarding the returns from vocational and academic education and is any general 
answer possible as to which has the higher returns? Thirdly, and most specifically, which forms 
of educational investment have been most profitable in terms of increasing incomes - vocational 
school, technical college, academic education or on-the-job training - in Tanzania?  
The first of these questions is linked to the shape of the earnings function and the second 
and third to the role of firm effects in determining earnings. While there are two routes through 
the education system, one academic and the second vocational, they are not separate. The 
academic stream - from primary to O-level, to A-level, to professional or university - is the 
preferred route as the returns to education are far higher at the A-level stage and above than 
below that level. This pattern holds for the OLS earnings function and when we allow for the 
potential endogeneity of education and for firm fixed effects
6. It is this pattern of returns that can 
explain the continuing strong preference for academic education. The vocational stream is one 
entered at various levels from the academic. While the return from vocational schooling can 
exceed that for the academic, at the level at which entry occurs, at no level does the return from 
vocational schooling remotely match that at the higher academic levels.  
In addressing our second general question - what can account for the diversity of the 





training or technical school. The first is the necessity of identifying the point at which the student 
enters the vocational stream, given the structure of the Tanzanian education system where entry 
can occur at different points along the educational ladder; the second is the importance of the size 
of the firm in which the worker is employed and the third is the importance of unobserved firm 
fixed effects.  
Students enter vocational and technical college at different points along the educational 
path. In Tanzania the two most common paths are to enter vocational school after primary (66% 
of those attending vocational school in the sample) and to enter technical college after O-level 
(80% of those attending technical college in the sample). In assessing the return to going to either 
vocational or technical school it is necessary to know the return from completing primary or O-
level. We have shown that these returns depend on the size of the firm in which the worker is 
employed. There are two general patterns in the data. The first is that the return to vocation or 
technical education is lower the higher the level at which it is entered. The second is that returns 
to all levels of academic education are higher in large than small firms but this is not true for 
some levels of the vocational/technical stream.  
The finding that firm size has a much bigger impact on academic educational levels, 
particularly those at O and A-level than on vocational education can be regarded as a 
confirmation of the argument that Foster (1965a,b) makes against vocational training. By 
teaching narrowly defined skills rather than the ability to solve problems such training fails to 
develop general skills which firms with any degree of technical sophistication find most useful. 
The fact that the returns to academic education rise much faster with firm size than those for 
vocational education is consistent with this view. However it does not follow that the return to 
vocational school or technical college is lower than that for those with primary school or O-
levels.  
Once we allow for the effects of firm size we find that the returns to vocational education 
after primary are much higher than the returns to primary school and higher even than that for O-
level. As we have already stressed these are much lower than the academic returns from A-level 
and above. We also find, once we allow for the effects of firm size, the return to 
vocational/technical after A-Level can be negative. This effect is mitigated, although not entirely 
eliminated, by allowing for firm fixed effects. One possible interpretation of this result is that the 
firm fixed effect can be interpreted as capturing an element of unobserved quality of the worker 
or of the firm. If this interpretation is accepted then the negative return to vocational education 
after A-level reflects, in part, not the effects of the training but a combination of the quality of the 
worker and of the work place in which they are employed.  
We have also shown the importance of firm effects for assessing the impact of training 
on earnings. The returns are very different across small and large firms. Rather strikingly we can 





effects. One interpretation of this result is that the training effect gets incorporated in the firm 
fixed effect which captures an increase in the quality of the workforce. This benefits all those 
working in the firm but not differentially those being trained.  
While we have shown that firm effects, including size, matter for the returns to 
vocational relative to academic education there are other factors which the literature has also 
shown to matter but for which we do not have relevant data. The returns to vocational school may 
depend on the matching of the skills with employment outcomes. It may differ if the paths 
through education allow switches between a vocational and an academic stream rather then the 
pattern which prevails in Tanzania where entry into vocational, it seems clear, is a result of being 
unable to proceed though the academic and which ends the possibility of entering higher 
education.  
Finally turning to our third question: which forms of educational investment are most 
profitable? Do these results imply that vocational education should be encouraged relative to 
academic? Clearly that inference cannot be dawn from these results for, at least, three reasons. 
The first, to which we have already referred, is that the costs of supplying vocational and 
academic education differ and we have abstracted from those costs in this discussion. The 
second, and more fundamental, reason is that the pattern of rising returns with the level of 
education suggests that the issue is not primarily between the academic and vocational paths but 
the appropriate rate of investment at different levels for either path. The third, and one that is of 
particular importance for Tanzania at present, is the potential importance of the workplace in 
which those being trained will be employed. The returns to both academic and vocational training 
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Appendix 1  The Data 
Variable   Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
       
earn94  Monthly earnings in 1994 
Tanzanian Shillings  30,868.3 45,344.8  413.3 1,002,278.0
lern94us  ln(Monthly earnings) in 1994  3.8 0.7 -0.3 7.6 
earn94us  Monthly earnings in US$  60.6 89.0  0.8  1966.7 
male  Dummy=1 if male  0.83 0.37  0  1 
capcity  Dummy=1 if in capital city  0.48 0.50  0  1 
age  Age of the worker  34.96 10.22  15  65 
exp  Experience of the worker  20.34 11.00  1  59 
tenure  Length of time in job  8.20 7.70  0  42 
educ  Education in years of worker  8.62 3.35  0  16 
none  No education  0.04 0.20  0  1 
primary  Primary completed  0.48 0.50  0  1 
middle  Middle School completed  0.02 0.16  0  1 
olevel  O-Level Completed  0.10 0.30  0  1 
alevel  A-Level Completed  0.02 0.13  0  1 
vocation  Attended vocational school  0.20 0.40  0  1 
techcol  Attended Technical College  0.05 0.23  0  1 
profes  Post A-level Professional  0.06 0.23  0  1 
highered  University completed  0.02 0.16  0  1 
train_curent  Currently receiving training  0.09 0.29  0  1 
train_past Received  training in the past in 
this firm  0.23 0.42  0  1 
train_sc  Attended a short training course  0.09 0.29  0  1 
voc_primary  Vocation after primary  0.13 0.34  0  1 
voc_middle  Vocation after middle  0.01 0.09  0  1 
voc_olevel  Vocation after O-level  0.05 0.23  0  1 
voc_alevel  Vocation after A-level  0.01 0.07  0  1 
techcol_olevel  Technical after O-level  0.04 0.20  0  1 
techcol_alevel  Technical after A-level  0.01 0.08  0  1 
mgmt  Dummy=1 if Manager  0.03 0.16  0  1 
admin  Dummy =1 if Administrator  0.06 0.24  0  1 
cleric  Dummy=1 if Clerical  0.08 0.26  0  1 
sales  Dummy=1 if sales  0.04 0.19  0  1 
super  Dummy =1 if supervisor  0.07 0.26  0  1 
tech  Dummy =1 if technician  0.13 0.33  0  1 
prod  Dummy=1 if production worker  0.60 0.49  0  1 
emp  Number of Employees in firm  105.35 278.51  1  2100 
ll    3.32 1.48  0  7.65 
educdad  Father's education in years  5.97 4.43  0  20 
educmum  Mother's education in years  4.46 4.13  0  20 
farmdad  Dummy =1 if father a farmer  0.45 0.50  0  1 
farmmum  Dummy=1 if mother a farmer  0.64 0.48  0  1 
profdad  Dummy= if father professional  0.10 0.30  0  1 
profmum  Dummy=1 if mother professional  0.04 0.18  0  1 
Number of observations =2527.  
The sample is confined to African workers aged between 15 and 65, apprentices are excluded. The data is 





Appendix 2  The Mincerian Rates of Return 
Whole Sample  ROR ROR_ee  ROR_fe  ROR_fe_ee 
Primary  2.8 2.3 0.6 -0.6 
Vocational Education After Primary  9.6 8.5 7.3 4.8 
O-Level  10.3 9.3  7.3  5.1 
Vocational Education After O-Level  8.8 8.0  10.8  8.7 
Technical College After O-Level  10.5 9.3  9.9  7.2 
A-Level  40.2 39.1 22.0 19.8 
Vocational Education After A-Level  3.2 1.8 3.4 0.3 
Technical College After A-Level  7.3 6.1 4.7 1.7 
Professional  28.8 27.1 20.5 16.8 
University Education  34.6 33.1 24.7 21.3 
 
Men Only  ROR ROR_ee  ROR_fe  ROR_fe_ee 
Primary  2.6 1.8 0.5 -0.5 
Vocational Education After Primary  11.1 9.5  6.8  5.0 
O-Level  10.2 8.7  7.7  6.0 
Vocational Education After O-Level  7.5 6.1 6.4 4.7 
Technical College After O-Level  13.9 12.1  8.9  6.9 
A-Level  37.0 35.3 20.4 18.4 
Vocational Education After A-Level  3.3 1.6 -1.0  -2.6 
Technical College After A-Level  6.5 4.6 3.8 1.6 
Professional  25.1 22.6 20.8 17.9 











Primary  2.7 2.8 1.0 0.1 0.0 -0.8 
Vocational Education After Primary  7.6 11.7  10.5  13.7 8.3 11.5 
O-Level  7.8 9.0 6.9 7.7 5.1 5.9 
Vocational Education After O-Level  1.8  3.2  13.1 14.7 11.3 12.9 
Technical College After O-Level  4.9 8.3 8.1  13.2  5.8  10.9 
A-Level  25.7 34.6 14.7 22.7 13.4 20.8 
Vocational Education After A-Level  -7.1 -12.0 0.1  -5.2  -2.0  -6.6 
Technical College After A-Level  -4.7 -6.0 -3.6 -3.5 -5.5 -5.0 
Professional  -4.6 20.1 5.1 22.5 2.8 19.8 
University Education  14.1 12.5 25.2 19.0 23.1 17.2 
 








Primary  2.1 3.5 1.1 -0.3 0.3 -1.0 
Vocational Education After Primary  4.2  2.3 11.4  17.2 9.4 14.8 
O-Level  7.5 8.7 6.9 8.2 5.4 6.8 
Vocational Education After O-Level  -4.4 -8.3 8.6 11.4 6.8  9.2 
Technical College After O-Level  8.1 3.1 8.4  12.6  6.5  10.5 
A-Level  25.2 32.6 15.0 20.6 13.7 18.9 
Vocational Education After A-Level  -14.1  -22.1  -3.1 -5.3 -4.3 -6.4 
Technical College After A-Level  -1.5 -9.4 0.2 0.8 -1.7 -1.0 
Professional  -12.0 7.4  4.5 24.9 2.3 22.0 
















Current Training in the Firm  8.7 17.3  -7.0 3.0 -7.0 2.9 
Past Firm-Level Training  -0.9 6.4 -3.6 0.0 -3.6 0.2 
Short Course Training Attended  13.3  13.7 7.6 11.7 6.6 11.8 
 
Male only 








Current Training in the Firm  5.1 13.0  -12.2  -0.6  -12.1  -0.7 
Past Firm-Level Training  -2.7 7.7 -5.3 1.2 -5.4 1.3 
Short Course Training Attended  16.4  10.5  7.3 6.2 6.5 6.1 
 
Definitions: 
ROR is the Mincerian rate of return with no controls. 
ROR_ee is the Mincerian rate of return allowing for endogenous education. 
ROR_fe is the Mincerian rate of return allowing for fixed effects.  
ROR_fe_ee is the Mincerian rate of return allowing for fixed effects and endogenous education. 
ROR_10 is the Mincerian rate of return in a small firm (one employing 10). 
ROR_100 is the Mincerian rate of return in a large firm (one employing 100).   
ROR_10_fe is the Mincerian rate of return in a small firm with fixed effects. 
ROR_100_fe is the Mincerian rate of return in a large firm with fixed effects.  
ROR_10_fe_ee is the Mincerian rate of return in a small firm allowing for firms fixed effects and 
endogenous education. 
ROR_100_fe_ee is the Mincerian rate of return in a large firm allowing for firms fixed effects 






Appendix 3  Endogenous Education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 educ  train_current  train_past  train_sc 
male -0.684  0.055  0.054  -0.007 
 (2.65)**  (2.16)*  (1.36)  (0.31) 
capcity  -0.341 0.049  -0.035 0.016 
  (1.22) (1.97)*  (1.08) (0.94) 
exp 0.099  -0.012  -0.015  0.004 
  (2.92)** (3.67)** (3.58)** (1.41) 
expsq -0.363  0.013  0.010  -0.006 
 (6.13)**  (2.58)*  (1.34)  (1.32) 
tenure  0.003 0.001 0.012 0.002 
 (0.18)  (0.87)  (5.79)**  (1.44) 
educdad 0.094       
 (2.93)**       
educmum 0.013      
 (0.46)       
farmdad 0.047       
 (0.19)       
farmmum -0.406      
 (1.66)       
profdad 1.317       
 (3.92)**       
profmum 0.274      
 (0.57)       
educ   -0.001  -0.009  0.020 
   (0.15)  (1.56)  (5.94)** 
mgmt   -0.009  0.099  0.146 
   (0.20)  (1.11)  (2.09)* 
admin   -0.020  0.062  0.157 
   (0.57)  (0.98)  (3.61)** 
cleric   -0.033  -0.038  0.181 
   (1.07)  (0.80)  (3.96)** 
sales   -0.043  -0.098  0.061 
   (0.74)  (1.76)  (1.18) 
super   -0.049  -0.020  0.046 
   (2.09)*  (0.36)  (1.19) 
tech  -0.015  -0.032  -0.010 
   (0.54)  (0.82)  (0.70) 
ll   0.025  0.022  0.010 
   (2.31)*  (1.82)  (1.22) 
Constant 8.853 0.127 0.323 -0.223 
 (15.93)**  (1.85)  (3.53)**  (5.13)** 
Observations  2527 2527 2527 2527 
R-squared  0.22 0.06 0.07 0.17 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
 
In this appendix we present the auxiliary regression for education which underlies the regression 
results in Tables 3 and 4 which control for endogeneity. As is well-known, the OLS estimator 
will give biased estimates of the returns to education if education is ‘endogenous’, i.e. correlated 
with the residual in the earnings equation. A common concern in the literature is that education 
may be positively correlated with unobserved labour market ability, and that the estimates of the 
returns to education would be upward biased as a result. To allow for a general earnings-





earnings, we adopt a two-stage control function approach, Garen (1984). In the first stage we run 
a regression of education on a set of instruments. Based on this regression we estimate the 
residual, denoted res_educ. In the second stage we estimate an earnings function in which 
res_educ is used as a ‘control variable’ for ability. Provided standard conditions for identification 
hold, and provided the instruments are independent of ability and uncorrelated with the equation 
residual, this procedure will give consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. We have data 
on parents’ education and main occupations. These are our potential instruments for education. 
As discussed in Söderbom et al (2006) it is possible that the control function also addresses the 
sample selectivity problem. The requirement is that the instruments are independent of the error 
term in the selected sample. 
  In this appendix we also include regressions, which are the linear probability model, for 
our three dimensions of training - past current and attending a short training course. The 
determinants of training depend on the type. It is only for those attending a short training course 
that education appears to increase the probability of attending. Firm size is most important for 
those currently receiving training. We experimented with finding instruments for training but 
were unsuccessful. As we acknowledge in the text our results cannot allow for the possible 







                                                           
1 This definition of the Mincerian return converts the dummy variable to an annualised equivalent 
increment in earnings by assuming that the growth in earnings between education levels is 
exponential. For small differences in earnings across education levels there is little difference 
between this definition and one which assumes growth is linear,  (exp( ) 1)/2 pv v p ROR θ θ = −− . 
However the differences are substantial when the earnings differentials are as large as they 
become beyond O-level.  
2 As the summary statistics in Appendix 1 show only 17 per cent of the sample is female. We 
have checked if the education and training parameters differ by gender and at the 1 per cent 
significance level we can reject the null they are the same across men and women. We report in 
Appendix 2 the rates of return for a sample confined to men only. However given the small 
representation of women in the sample the conclusions drawn should be viewed as applying most 
clearly to men.   
3 The data which is summarised in the Figure can be found in Appendix 2. 
4 Psacharopoulos (1994, page 1326) objects to the Mincerian assumptions when it comes to 
assessing the return to primary school on the grounds that the forgone earnings of those aged 
from 7 to 14 are not earnings of adults with no education which the ROR calculations implicitly 
assume. However there is evidence that child labour is substantial in Tanzania particularly in 
rural areas. Burke and Beegle (2004) have data for rural Tanzania which shows that for 47 per 
cent of the sample a child wage is reported in the community and 62 per cent of children are 
engaged in farming. Imputing wages to child labour is clearly problematic. Our data implies that 
a primary education increases annual earnings by some US$85. The internal rate of return on an 
income stream of US$ 85 per year for 50 years with an annual cost of US$360 per year for seven 
years is 2 per cent. If we assume that the actual cost is half this then the internal rate of return 
becomes 5 per cent. Such an assumption imputes an income of US$15 per month which does not 
seem unreasonable. It is clear that the private Mincerian rate of return at the primary level is far 
below that at A-level and beyond.   
5 In previous work on training in Tanzanian firms, Beyer (1990) also finds no effect from past 
training in the firm onto earnings. She does however find that the earnings profile is steeper for 
those undergoing training. We have investigated whether this is true for our data and find it is 
not. 
6 That the Mincerian return to education rises with the level of that education is consistent with 
Bennell’s (1996c) argument that the pattern of returns presented by Psacharopoulos (1994) does 
not apply in Africa. 